On December 13, 2024, in Chapman v. Brentlinger Enterprises, the U.S. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a woman who requested and was denied FMLA leave to care for her sister stood “in loco parentis” to her adult sister under the Act, and therefore should have been granted FMLA leave. The Court overruled the District Court’s holding that a parent-child relationship must have developed before the onset of the sister’s illness for Chapman to qualify for FMLA leave under these circumstances. While the Court acknowledged that the statutory text did not answer the question of whether a parent-child relationship would apply, the Court rejected the FMLA interpretations offered by the employer and instead relied upon ordinary definitions:
The FMLA covers more than biological and adoptive families by its plain text. A “parent” can be “an individual who stood in loco parentis to an employee when the employee was a son or daughter.” An employee can also be an in loco parentis parent. Either way, the statute defines “son or daughter” to mean “a biological, adopted, or foster child, a stepchild, a legal ward, or a child of a person standing in loco parentis, who is – (A) under 18 years of age; or (B) 18 years of age or older and incapable of self-care because of a mental or physical disability.”
Thus, the Court concluded that the FMLA recognizes a special relationship where one person acts “in loco parentis”—literally, in the place of a parent—to a dependent person or “child.” Furthermore, the Court stated that both sisters would qualify for FMLA leave. In contrast, the District Court had held that an in loco parentis relationship could not form between adult siblings because the parent-child relationship was not established when one of the siblings was a minor. Also, the underlying condition that required one sibling to care for another had not yet manifested. The Sixth Circuit dismissed all of these arguments and held that the only necessary element to be proven in the FMLA case on the issue of whether an individual stood “in loco parentis” to another was the adult parties’ intent to form such a relationship.
To analyze the issue of intent, the Court looked at several factors. The Court indicated that in loco parental status would require something more than giving aid to a loved one who could use the help—the individual must also have exercised control over or assumed the other individual’s obligations in some way. The Court considered whether the loco parentis parent (1) is in close physical proximity to the adult loco parentis child; (2) assumes responsibility to support them; (3) exercises control or has rights over them; (4) and has a close emotional or familial bond with them, akin to that of an adult child. However, the Court also cautioned, “This list is not exclusive, no single factor is dispositive, and they should not be weighed like a math problem. But they are the types of factors we have looked to in evaluating similar in loco parentis relationships in the past and may provide guidance to courts in the future.
Given this latest ruling, employers should proceed with caution in denying any FMLA leave request based on the employee’s need to care for a person who is technically not a member of the employee’s family. This may involve a request for clarification about the employee’s relationship to the other individual where it is not immediately apparent. Employers may also wish to review their current policies to ensure legal compliance with the FMLA.
The attorneys at Pickrel, Schaeffer & Ebeling can help navigate this latest decision and any employee-related matters. Please get in touch with Kristina Curry at 937.223.1130 or kcurry@pselaw.com.
